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Abstract 
Challenge Theory (CT) is a new approach to decision under risk that departs significantly from expected utility and is 
based firmly on psychological, rather than economic, assumptions. The paper demonstrates that a purely 
cognitive-psychological paradigm for decision under risk can yield excellent predictions, comparable to those attained 
by more complex economic or psychological models that remain attached to conventional economic constructs and 
assumptions. The study presents a new model for predicting the popularity of choices made in binary risk problems. 
A CT-based regression model is tested on data gathered from 126 respondents who indicated their preferences with 
respect to 44 choice problems. Results support CT's central hypothesis, strongly associating between the Challenge 
Index (CI) attributable to every binary risk problem, and the observed popularity of the bold prospect in that problem 
(with r=-0.92 and r=-0.93 for gains and for losses, respectively). The novelty of the CT perspective as a new paradigm 
is illuminated by its simple, single-index (CI) representation of psychological effects proposed by Prospect Theory for 
describing choice behavior (certainty effect, reflection effect, overweighting small probabilities and loss aversion).  
Keywords: decision making under risk, dual system model, cognitive processes, gambling, risky choice by gender, 
risky choice by wealth  
1. Introduction 
In the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) the utility of an uncertain prospect is the sum of the utilities of the outcomes, each 
weighted by its probability. In choosing between two or more prospects, the rational decision-maker should prefer a 
prospect that maximizes utility (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Savage, 1954). Given a decision problem whose 
prospects have different utilities, a unique prospect should be chosen by different people as well as by the same person 
on different occasions. 
Systematic violations of the EUT observed in human behavior have led to the development of descriptive theories that 
aim to predict people's actual decision behavior. Such descriptive theories tend to adopt EUT's conceptual framework as 
a point of departure and proceed to explain observed violations of EUT by introducing modifications to this basic theory. 
Thus, Prospect Theory (PT) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), arguably the most influential 
descriptive model, accounts for observed violations of EUT axioms by proposing functions that assign effective values 
to gains and to losses (rather than to the total assets); and effective weights to the given probabilities. A different 
modification of EUT is proposed, e.g., by Regret Theory (Loomes & Sugden, 1982, 1987): a prospect's utility-function 
is fashioned to incorporate feelings of regret and rejoicing anticipated by the decision maker. The decision maker aims 
then to maximize the expected modified utility function.  
PT and similar descriptive models, referred to as deterministic, follow in EUT's footsteps in their aim to predict the one 
prospect that is preferable to all others, where the empirical confirmation of the prediction is embodied in the modal 
prospect, the one preferred by most respondents in a sample of decision makers. Striving for a unique solution may be 
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natural for an economic-prescriptive theory concerned with profit optimization but is less natural for a genuine 
descriptive theory, concerned with predicting people's actual behavior. From such a theory one would expect a richer 
characterization of choice behavior, such as people's inclination to prefer each of the prospects offered, as reflected in 
the distribution of responses to a given risk problem. Indeed, stochastic decision theories have been proposed (for 
example, Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Erev et al., 2002) that aim to predict the popularity of a particular prospect, 
notably in binary risk problems. 
A distinct birthmark inherited from EUT by many descriptive theories is the assignment of a value V(f) to every 
prospect f, such that prospect f is preferred to prospect g iff V(f)>V(g). And, in line with EUT, V(f) is computed as the 
sum of the outcome utilities, each weighted by a transformation of corresponding probability (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) or by decision weights that derive from transforming the entire cumulative distribution function (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). Thus, predictions of descriptive theories assume (tacitly at least) that a decision maker faced with 
two or more risky prospects performs in effect the following mental operations:  
(a) Multiplying the outcome-value by the outcome probability-weight to obtain the expected utility for each outcome;  
(b) Summing up the expected utilities of all outcomes of a prospect, to obtain the prospect's value V(f);  
(c) Comparing the overall utilities of all prospects offered, identifying one of highest value.  
The essential structure of the prospect-utility assessments (steps (a) and (b)) is clearly illustrated by the weighted-sum 
form of the value V(f) assigned to each prospect f: 
𝑉(𝑓) = ∑[𝑣(𝑥𝑖) ∙ 𝑤(𝑝𝑖)] 
(See, for example, Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, Eq. (2); Loomes & Sugden 1982, Eq. (2); Erev et al., 2010, Eq. (1)). 
Having determined the value V(f) for each of the available prospects, step (c), of comparing every pair of prospects, 
amounts to computing the difference between their values (for example, Loomes & Sugden, 1982, Eq. (4)) or a 
monotone function of that difference (Erev et al., 2010, Eq. (4)). This is true for stochastic theories as well for 
deterministic theories. (See, for example, Busemeyer & Townsand, 1993; Erev et al., 2002). 
While the three operations (a)-(c) may well be performed by adequately schooled people acting within a professional 
setting, they are not likely to be mentally carried out by people (schooled or not) in daily intuitive decision making. 
Evidently, descriptive theories have not substantiated or rationalized these mental operations to be part of any 
psychological modeling of decision making under risk. Rather, most descriptive theories began by accepting EUT and 
proceeded to modify it just as necessary in order to account for observed violations of its axioms and prescriptions.  
Adherence to EUT conceptual framework, including the weighted-sum criterion, traditionally constrained the 
development of a genuine descriptive theory for choice under risk. Hence psychological theories that focus on the 
decision process rather than on its consequences, have emerged. See Weber & Johnson (2009) for a review of choice 
phenomena research that hinges on psychological -- cognitive and affective -- processes. Among these, processes that 
rely on the dual system approach (Stanovich & West, 2000; Kahneman, 2011) have a special appeal in as much as they 
attempt to integrate two distinct kinds of processes that directly concern stimuli evaluation and decision-making: the 
automatic system and the analytic system. Indeed, dual processing models for decision making have been employed for 
explaining decision behavior (e.g., Kahneman, 2003; Sanfey et al., 2006).  
The automatic system (also referred to as System 1 or Type 1 processing) is autonomic: The execution of System 1 
processing is involuntary and typically rapid and unconscious (Stanovich, 2011). System 1 processing has been 
described as associative and heuristic (e.g., Sloman, 1996; Evans, 1984; 1989); as relying on intuitive cognition 
(Hammond, 1996); as tacit thought processes (Evans & Over, 1996) including tacit inferences (Johnson-Laird, 1983); as 
an automatic activation (Posner & Snyder, 1975); and as evolutionary old (Evans, 2008). In contrast with the automatic 
system, processing of the analytic system (also referred to as System 2 or Type 2 processing) is deliberate and slow, 
involving controlled analytic intelligence. It has also been described as a rule-based system (e.g., Sloman, 1996); as 
relying on analytical cognition (Hammond, 1996); as an explicit thought process (Evans & Over, 1996) including 
explicit inferences (Johnson-Laird, 1983); as a conscious processing system (Posner & Snyder, 1975) and as 
evolutionary new (Evans, 2008).  
The automatic system, like the analytic system, is characterized by an emphasis on the cognitive behavior mode (cf. 
Evans, 2008. Note also its description in terms of intuitive cognition; thought processes; and inferences). Yet, free from 
a higher control system, it also incorporates beliefs and affective behaviors, shaped by psychological and social 
evolutionary processes, as fast, effort-saving ways for heuristically coping with adaptive problems (Finucane et al., 
2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001). However, under the umbrella of the dual system approach to decision-making, the two 
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systems are often interpreted as representing the very distinction between the affective and the cognitive modes of 
decision-making behavior (see e.g., Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004). An application of the 
affective-cognitive duality to decision making is proposed by Mukherjee's (2010) model depicting the decision process 
as a convex combination of affective and cognitive processes, each marked by characteristic shapes of the value 
function and of the weighting function.  
In this article, we develop a new theory, called the Challenge Theory (CT), that examines decisions under risk as a 
behavioral phenomenon in and by itself, free of any preconception of which decisions are rational or otherwise 
desirable; a domain of investigation in which stable empirical patterns, and ultimately laws, are to be discovered, 
leading to predictions in this domain. In so doing we believe we follow the common practice in theory-oriented 
empirical sciences.  
Challenge Theory is a dual system theory in that it acknowledges that two kinds of processes, two systems, participate 
in decision making: the fast (automatic) and the slow (analytic). While formulating the two systems in essentially 
cognitive terms (à la Stanovich, e.g.), CT does not preclude the possibility that decision maker's feelings, actual or 
anticipated, play some role in both systems: in the automatic system, as a fast way to respond; and in the analytic 
system as an object (among others) to be considered in the deliberate calculations. Furthermore, CT models the systems 
as working sequentially, with the automatic processing reaching a fast, initial decision, followed by the analytic 
processing, acting in a supervisory role: affirming or modifying the initial decision. This is in contrast with Mukherjee's 
(2010) dual system model, where two processing systems, the one defined as affective and the other as cognitive, are 
described as operating in parallel.  
The plan of this article is as follows. Section 2 presents a reconstruction of the decision maker's cognitive process in the 
face of a binary choice problem, culminating in a formula that assesses the degree of difficulty, or challenge-level, 
experienced by the decision maker in abandoning the option defined here as the default option and choosing the option 
defined here as the bold option. Section 3 presents and tests the General Hypothesis of Challenge Theory, namely, that 
the challenge level, attributable to every binary choice problem, predicts people's inclination (probability) to choose the 
bold option in that problem. The possibility afforded by the Challenge Theory to explore individual differences is 
illustrated in Section 4. The discussion in Section 5 elaborates on the specifications, significance and implications of 
Challenge Theory as a novel paradigm. It also elaborates on CT's integrated representation of psychological effects 
proposed by Prospect Theory, as well as on some general questions – the role of extant wealth in gambling and the 
gain-loss asymmetry.  
2. Decision-Making as a Mental Process: A Reconstruction 
We are concerned with choice problems where the decision-maker must choose one of k+1 prospects, (x0, p0), (x1, 
p1) … (xk, pk), wherein the outcome of each is a monetary gain, xi (0<xi<∞) with a known probability pi (0<pi≤1), 
i=0,1,…,k and 0 with probability (1- pi). We assume p0>p1>p2>…>pk and 0<x0< x1<…<xk.  
Alternatively, the outcome of each of the k+1 prospects is a monetary loss, xi (-∞<xi<0) with a known probability pi 
(0<pi≤1), i=0, 1,…,k and 0 with probability (1-pi). Here, xi being all negative, we assume p0>p1>p2>…>pk and 
0>x0>x1>…>xk. 
A choice problem with these characteristics will be called a simple decision problem. In this article we consider simple 
binary decision problems, those with k=1. This class of problems has been used extensively in previous studies and 
simulates many common problems encountered in real-life situations. The ideas developed here can be extended to 
decision problems with any k. Our aim is to develop a theory, as simple and purposeful as possible, that would explain 
and enable predictions of people's inclination (probability) to prefer one of the prospects in a binary decision problem 
over the other.  
2.1 The Case of Gains 
Let us consider first gain problems, i.e., decision problems with x1>x0>0. The decision-maker is faced with two options 
(x0, p0) and (x1, p1), each containing two numerical parameters, the (positive) outcome, xi, and the probability of 
receiving it, pi. The total information input consists therefore of four numerical values to be processed mentally in order 
to reach a decision. The decision-maker's initial impression of the problem is governed by his automatic mental 
processing system (System 1 or Type 1 processing (Stanovich & West, 2000; Stanovich 2011; cf. also Kahneman, 2011)), 
which, we claim, stresses the probabilities rather than the outcomes. Hence, we assume that a person's initial attraction, 
or default preference, would be to (x0, p0), the prospect that promises the highest probability for some gain. This 
assumption is based on an extension of the certainty effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) which posits the preference of 
the sure outcome over the unsure outcome, to the more general assertion that posits the preference of the surer (more 
probable) outcome over the less sure outcome. But there is a more substantive rationale for (x0, p0) being the heuristic 
choice of the automatic processing system: this system, by its very nature, concerns the most vital organismic needs, 
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including the survival of the organism. If gaining some amount, however small, of a vital resource can save the 
organism, then just maximizing the probability of its attainment would be the right response.  
If the decision is not of urgent nature, the initial automatic preference is tentatively withheld, and is followed by an 
analytic processing (System 2 or Type 2 processing (Stanovich & West, 2000; Stanovich 2011; cf. also Kahneman, 
2011)). The analytic processing system consists in comparing, weighting, and generally re-assessing the initial response 
of the automatic processing system. In fact, "One of the most critical functions of Type 2 processing is to override Type 
1 processing" (Stanovich, 2011, p. 20). Indeed, the opportunity to win a greater amount, x1, albeit with reduced 
probability, prompts the decision-maker to re-consider his initial automatic preference of prospect (x0, p0), and analyze 
all available information, x0, p0, x1, p1. For this purpose, the decision-maker creates images of the possible consequences 
of each of the choices1.  
Our attempt to capture the analytic System 2 processing hinges on the assumption that prospect (x1, p1) in effect 
challenges the chooser to abandon the default prospect (x0, p0) and choose it, (x1, p1), the bold prospect
2. The challenge 
consists in facing the dissonance anticipated should the bold prospect be chosen, and the chooser loses the gamble. 
Psychologically, the dissonance anticipated may be of any of four kinds, or modalities: conative (regret, where the 
gambler would conclude he should have acted differently); cognitive (where the gambler realizes that the outcome 
conflicts with his prior perceptions, judgments or calculations); affective (feeling of disappointment and self-directed 
blame or anger); or valuative (degradation, shame or guilt upon the realization that one's choice-behavior conflicts with 
one's self-image, values, or adopted norms)3. An assessment of the total challenge presented by the various forms of 
dissonance is of interest in that, as we shall see, it can help predict people's inclination to choose the bolder prospects 
when faced with decision under risk; and possibly suggest which human traits correspond to higher inclination to prefer 
bold prospects. We turn therefore to an assessment of the magnitude of the described challenge. The following 
assessment is based on a reconstruction of possible mental processes that take place in the chooser's mind. 
Faced with a binary gains problem, the chooser imagines the situation in which he would be, if he gambles on the bold 
prospect, (x1, p1), and loses. His attention would then turn to the lower amount, x0, which he could have had with a 
higher probability: ceteris paribus, the greater it is, the greater the anticipated dissonance; and therefore, the greater the 
challenge posed by the bold prospect. Hence, we conclude that this challenge increases with x0.  
The role of the greater amount, x1, in this decision-making situation seems clear. It is this amount that lures the chooser 
and beckons her to pick the bold prospect. The chooser may contemplate: "should I lose my gamble on the bold 
prospect, I could rationalize that the prospect of winning this greater amount, x1, justified my choice: I gave myself a 
chance". The greater is this amount, the lower the anticipated dissonance; and the lower the challenge presented by the 
bold prospect. We conclude therefore that this challenge decreases with x1.  
Finally, how do the given probabilities figure in the assessment of the challenge calculation? Having lost the bold 
gamble, the chooser would not like to feel he had made a grave error in judgment (cognitive dissonance). Thus, if p0 is 
very close to p1 the anticipated dissonance would be correspondingly small, since he could rationalize: "under these 
circumstances I could have just as well (with a similar probability) lost the smaller amount". But if p0 is much higher 
than p1, dissonances of all kinds could creep in. In general, then, the greater the difference p0-p1, the greater the 
anticipated dissonance; and the greater the challenge posed by the bold prospect. We conclude therefore that in general 
this challenge increases with p0-p1.  
The Challenge Index (CI) in the case of gains, posed to the chooser by the bold prospect (x1, p1) relative to the default 
prospect (x0, p0), could therefore be given by: 
                                  𝐶𝐼[(𝑥0, 𝑝0), (𝑥1, 𝑝1)] =
𝑓0(𝑥0)
𝑓1(𝑥1)
𝑔(𝑝0 − 𝑝1)                            (1)
     
                                                        
1 Cf. "[better responses] come from processes of hypothetical reasoning and cognitive simulation that are a unique 
aspect of Type 2 processing." Stanovich, (2011, p. 22). 
2 The term bold play has been used in a somewhat similar sense in the study of subfair red and black casino with 
zero-one utility function (Dubins & Savage, 1965; Shye, 1968; Heath et al., 1972). 
3 The first three behavior modalities are well known in psychological literature. The fourth, the valuative, concerns 
adopted beliefs and values that guide the individual (without the individual's actively evaluating them, hence it differs 
from the cognitive modality). The valuative modality can be shown by the Faceted Action System Theory (Shye, 1985; 
2014) to complete a 2X2 cartesian product set, of which the first three modalities are a subset.  
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where each of f0, f1 and g is a non-decreasing function of its respective argument.  
Eq. (1) assumes that the subtraction of p1 from p0 is mentally performed on these same figures as presented to the 
decision-maker; and that the decision-maker subsequently transforms the difference p0-p1 by 𝑔. An alternative, perhaps 
more likely assumption would be that each of the probabilities pi is first transformed, or weighted, and then a mental 
assessment of the difference between the weighted probabilities is performed. This assumption results in a variant 
expression for CI: 
                                      𝐶𝐼[(𝑥0, 𝑝0), (𝑥1, 𝑝1)] =
𝑓0(𝑥0)
𝑓1(𝑥1)
(𝑤0(𝑝0) − 𝑤1 (𝑝1 ))                        (2) 
where f0, f1, w0, w1 are non-decreasing functions of their respective arguments, and w0, w1 are such that 𝑤0(𝑝0) −
𝑤1 (𝑝1 ) > 0. 
2.2 The Case of Losses 
Let us look now at decision problems with x1<x0<0. The decision-maker is faced with two options (x0, p0) and (x1, p1), 
with p1<p0, each containing two numerical parameters, the (negative) outcomes, xi, and the probabilities of receiving 
them, pi. Again, the total information input consists of four numerical values to be processed mentally in order to reach 
a decision. But the decision-maker's initial impression of the problem is governed by his automatic mental processing 
system (System 1 processing), which, in this case too, is assumed to stress the probabilities rather than the outcomes. 
Hence, now, in the case of losses, we assume that a person's initial attraction, or default preference, would be (x1, p1); 
that is, the prospect that promises the lowest probability for any loss. This assumption, too, may be regarded an 
extension of the certainty effect, where the preference of a sure avoidance of a loss is extended to the preference for a 
surer avoidance (smaller probability) of a loss. This assumption is supported by deeper considerations: Geared to avoid 
any negative consequence, the rapid System 1 processing tends to focus on the probabilities rather than on assessing the 
relative gravity of the consequences4.  
Time and circumstances allowing, the analytic System 2 processing re-examines the automatic preference of (x1, p1), in 
view of the promise for a smaller loss (albeit with a higher probability) presented by the (loss-related-) bold prospect (x0, 
p0), weighing now all four pieces of information, x0, p0, x1, p1. Again, as in the case of gains, the decision-maker is 
challenged to abandon the (loss-related-) default prospect (x1, p1) and choose the bold prospect, (x0, p0), instead
5. The 
challenge consists in facing the dissonance anticipated should the bold prospect be chosen, and the chooser loses the 
gamble. We turn therefore to an assessment of the magnitude of this challenge. The following assessment is based on a 
reconstruction of possible mental processes that take place in the chooser's mind. 
Faced with a binary loss problem, the chooser imagines the situation in which he would be if he gambles on the bold 
prospect, (x0, p0), and loses. His attention would then turn to comparing the lower probability, p1, of the default (higher 
loss) prospect with the (higher) probability p0, with which he just lost the gamble. If p0 is very close to p1 the anticipated 
dissonance would be correspondingly small, since the decision-maker could rationalize: "Under these circumstances I 
could have just as well (with a similar probability) lost the higher amount, x1." But if p0 is much higher than p1, the 
                                                        
4 Cf. in the context of crime prevention, according to the National Institute of Justice (2016): "Research shows clearly 
that the chance of being caught is a vastly more effective deterrent than even draconian punishment". That is, increased 
risk of being caught (and getting some punishment) affects choice behavior more than increased punishments. See also 
Nagin, 2013.  
5 To illustrate the terminology and designations of this article consider the following examples of two problems 
 Default Prospect Bold Prospect 
Gain problem (200, 0.8) 
(x0, p0) 
(300, 0.6) 
(x1, p1) 
Loss problem (-300, 0.6) 
(x1, p1) 
(-200, 0.8) 
(x0, p0) 
In both, gain and loss problems, prospect (x0, p0) is characterized by the smaller amount (in absolute value) and by the 
higher probability, compared with the alternative prospect (x1, p1). In gains, prospect (x0, p0) is defined as the default; 
and in losses prospect (x1, p1) is defined as the default. This designation allows for a single CI formula (3) for both gains 
and for losses. Note that in the case of losses, the definition of the bold prospect differs from the common definition of 
the risky prospect. 
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dissonance could be great, since had he chosen the default (x1, p1) he could have, with greater probability, avoided any 
loss. In general, then, the greater the difference p0-p1, the greater the anticipated dissonance; and the greater the 
challenge posed by the bold prospect. We conclude therefore that in general this challenge increases with p0-p1.  
The appeal, if any, of the bold prospect lies in its lower loss, |x0|, (|x0|<|x1|). Ceteris paribus, the greater this lower loss, 
|x0|, the lower its appeal and the greater the anticipated dissonance; and therefore, the greater the challenge posed by the 
bold prospect. Hence, we conclude that this challenge increases with |x0|. 
The role of the greater loss, |x1|, in this decision-making situation, seems clear. It is this larger loss that may tempt the 
chooser to consider the bold alternative with its promise for a lower loss. The higher the default loss, |x1|, the lower the 
anticipated dissonance; and the lower the challenge presented by the bold prospect. We conclude therefore that this 
challenge decreases with |x1|.  
Adopting the assumption that it is the difference between weighted probabilities (rather than the weight of the difference 
between the probabilities) that should incorporated into the expression for the Challenge Index, CI, Eq. (3) holds for 
both loss problems as well as for gains problems:  
𝐶𝐼[(𝑥0, 𝑝0), (𝑥1, 𝑝1)] =
𝑓0|𝑥0|
𝑓1|𝑥1|
(𝑤0(𝑝0) − 𝑤1 (𝑝1 ))                       (3) 
Where f0, f1, w0, w1 are non-decreasing functions of their respective arguments, and w0, w1 are such that 𝑤0(𝑝0) −
𝑤1 (𝑝1 ) > 0. 
3. The Challenge Theory of Choice Under Risk 
Our main purpose is to explain and facilitate the prediction of people's inclination to prefer the bold prospect in a 
specified binary decision problem, where both prospects involve monetary gains (or, alternatively, both involve 
monetary losses) with known probabilities. Here, preference inclination is interpreted for a given population as the 
proportion of persons in that population who choose the bold prospect in the specified problem. The notion of 
Challenge is developed, and the Challenge index (CI) formulated, with this purpose in mind.  
3.1 The General Challenge Hypothesis 
The greater the challenge, CI, associated with a binary simple problem, the less likely are people to choose the bold 
prospect. 
Rationale: The challenge as defined presents an obstacle for the chooser in deciding to prefer the bold prospect over the 
default. The greater the challenge, the fewer the people who would surmount this obstacle.  
Scales: To test the general hypothesis, further specifications need to be made concerning the functional forms of f0, f1, 
w0, w1. For examining the viability of the psychologically based Challenge Theory as a descriptive theory, we adopt 
here those widely used forms that seem to us both promising and simple (not involving too many free parameters). Thus, 
for f0 and f1 we adopt the power function: 
                                    𝑓0 =  𝑥
𝑎0                 𝑓1 =  𝑥
𝑎1                                                              (4) 
and for w0, w1, we adopt the two-parameter "linear in log odds" functional form advanced by Gonzalez & Wu (1999): 
                                     𝑤𝑖(𝑝) =
𝛿𝑖𝑝
𝛾𝑖
𝛿𝑖𝑝
𝛾𝑖+ (1−𝑝)𝛾𝑖
           i = 0, 1                     (5)
       
characterized by two parameters: γi, that determines mainly the curvature of the weighting function (ranging from near 
linear to near step-function); and δi, that determines mainly the elevation of the weighting function, i.e., the overall 
inclination to underweight or overweight probabilities.  
As a measure of association between CI and the proportion of those preferring the bold prospect, we use the correlation 
coefficient, r. 
With the present choices of functional forms for the outcomes and the probabilities, Challenge Theory allows, in 
principle, for up to six free parameters for gains: a0, γ0, δ0, a1, γ1, δ1 and up to six free parameters for losses: a'0, γ'0, δ'0, a'1, 
γ'1, δ'1. Naturally, the greater the number of free parameters, the better the fit of the model to the data of a particular 
study, but the greater the risk of overfitting. In this study we examined 3, 4 and 6 parameter models and chose to present 
and elaborate on the model with the 4 parameters: a0, a1, γ, δ (i.e., γ0= γ1 ; δ0= δ1) for gains; and with the 4 parameters: 
a'0, a'1, γ', δ' for losses. This choice was based primarily on the extent of improvement in r, the resultant correlation 
coefficient between CI, the challenge level, and Pb, the proportion of respondents preferring the bold option. (See 
discussion in Section 5.5 below.)  
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3.2 Testing the General Challenge Hypothesis 
3.2.1 Data 
The data set for this study consists of responses to a questionnaire obtained from a sample of 126 twelfth-grade students 
at two upscale high schools in Jerusalem. Students in these schools are generally considered to be conscientious and 
highly motivated and they seemed to address themselves to the task of completing the questionnaires with due attention 
and concentration. No material incentives were offered.6 
The questionnaire included 44 simple binary choice problems, 22 gain problems and 22 loss problems. Problems were 
selected to represent a fairly wide range, with gains and losses ranging from 30 to 9000 Israeli Shekels; and 
probabilities ranging from 0.01 to 1.  
Analyses were performed also on data collected from samples of students and faculty members by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). Eleven simple binary choice problems were found in these data (six gain problems and five loss 
problems).  
For every choice problem, vi, two variables were recorded: 
1. The Challenge Index, CI(vi), as computed by equation (3); 
2. The percentage, Pb(vi), of respondents who choose the bold prospect. 
To test the Challenge Hypothesis, Pearson correlation coefficient, r, between CI and Pb was determined while searching 
for optimal values for the parameters x0, x1, γ, δ defined in Eqs. (4) and (5). The optimization was performed using 
Microsoft Excel GRG solver. 
In accordance with the hypothesis, we expected high negative correlations between CI(vi) and Pb(vi). 
3.2.2 Results 
Analyses were performed separately for gain problems and for loss problems since evidence points to the fact that these 
two classes of problems are perceived differently by decision makers (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992. See also Subsection 5.7 of the discussion below). Hence the values of parameters, a0, a1, γ, δ, may 
well be expected to differ for losses and for gains. 
Results obtained support the general challenge hypothesis: the greater the Challenge Index, CI, associated with a binary 
decision problem, the smaller the percentage of respondents who chose the bold prospect. This is found for the set of 
gain problems (r = -.92) as well as for the set of loss problems (r = -.93). See Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Pearson Correlation Coefficients, r, between Challenge Index, CI, and Observed Proportion, Pb, of Bold 
Responses for Gains and for Loss problems  
 r 
0.95 confidence 
interval 
a0 a1 γ δ 
Gains Problems 
n=22; N=126 
-.919 (-.966, -.813) 1.1936 1.2285 0.7336 2.6245 
Loss Problems 
n=22; N=126 
-.931 (-.971, -.839) 1.3349 1.4337 0.6505 3.5565 
                                                        
6
 Incentives could interfere with the main purpose of the study, namely, to understand decisions made by unschooled. 
people as well as by schooled people in their everyday life, decisions that (according to CT) result from of the mental 
interaction between the (automatic) system 1 and the (deliberate, calculating) system 2. Incentives are known to 
encourage the deliberate, calculating system 2. (Often this is indeed why they are used.) Since most of our respondents 
are familiar with the notion of expected value, they would regard the questions as a test of their knowledge (and hence 
aim for the economically "correct" answer), rather than reveal their endogenous inclination. Thus, the spontaneous 
balance between the two processing systems could be impaired. In the context of descriptive theories in general (not just 
dual system theories), some writers believe that incentives are not essential. For example, Camerer (1989) finds that 
"Subjects who actually played a gamble were no more reliable than subjects who did not play" and concludes his test of 
the effect of incentives: "Incentives make little difference in subjects' choices among gambles involving gains" (pp. 
82-83). Tversky & Kahneman (1992) conclude their discussion on the question of incentives thus: "The similarity 
between the results obtained with and without monetary incentives in choice between simple prospects provides no 
special reason for skepticism about experiments without contingent payment" (p. 316). 
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Interestingly, a0, a1 >1 both for losses and for gains, suggesting that, under the conceptual framework developed here, a 
convex value function optimizes predictions of bold choices. Indeed, the possibility of convex value (utility) functions, 
or functions are convex in segments of the monetary domain have been proposed and studied in the literature (e.g., 
Dubins & Savage, 1965; Friedman & Savage, 1948; Markowitz, 1952;). However, CT proposes a reformulation of the 
question of outcome values. See Subsection 5.4 of the discussion. As for the weighting functions, they were found to 
adhere to the expected shape -- concave at the lower probability range and convex at the higher part. But they switch 
their shape at a very high point on the 0-1 probability scale. Again, a different perspective on this question is suggested 
in Subsections 5.4 of the discussion. 
The results obtained here for the General Challenge Hypothesis lends support to the psychological assumptions and 
considerations of the Challenge Theory. 
 
(a) Gains 
 
(b) Losses 
Figure 1. Scatter Diagrams and Linear Regression Lines of Pb(vi) vs. CI(vi)  
       (a) for the 22 Gains Problems; (b) for the 22 Loss problems 
 
Of course, if the entire sample of 44 gain and loss problems is processed together (i.e., imposing the same set of four 
parameters on both, gain and loss problems), a lower correlation (r=-.87) is found between CI and Pb. See first row in 
Table 2. The second row in Table 2 shows a very high correlation (r=-.99) for Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) sample of 
11 gain and loss problems. However, this sample of problems is small, and the CI values are not well spread over their 
range.  
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Table 2. Pearson Correlation Coefficients, r, between Challenge Index, CI, (Eq. 3) and Observed Proportion, Pb, of Bold 
Responses for All (Gain & Loss) Problems of This Study and of Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) Study* 
 r 
0.95 confidence 
interval 
a0 a1 γ δ 
All Problems 
of this study 
n=44; N=126 
-.877 (-.929, -.780) 1.5392 1.4806 0.7633 2.9011 
All Binary Problems 
Of KT (1979) study 
n=10; N~70  
-.989 (-.997, -.956) 3.0 0.6145 0.5599 2.7184 
 
* Note that in Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) study, the expected value of the bold prospect is greater or equal to that of 
the default prospect, in all problems. In this study (where the expected value function plays no role) no such constraint 
was imposed on the selection of problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Scatter Diagrams and Linear Regression Lines of P(vi) vs. CI(vi) 
(a) for all 44 (Gain & Loss) Problems of This Study and (b) for all 11 (Gain & Loss) Problems of Kahneman & 
Tversky's (1979) Study 
 
Overall the results, demonstrating a very high negative and linear relationship between CI and the proportions of bold 
choices, provide substantial evidence for the proposed Challenge Theory. A two-fold cross validation performed on the 
data (see Appendix) provides further support for the proposed model. Nevertheless, replications must follow to establish 
the theory and examine whether different kinds of populations may require somewhat different optimization parameters 
to attain the high correlations hypothesized. 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 7, No. 2; 2020 
42 
 
4. Determinants of Bold Decisions 
As a descriptive, psychologically oriented theory, the Challenge Theory of decision making opens the way to investigate 
individual differences that are associated with decision under risk behavior. As an illustration of this possibility we 
formulate and test the following hypothesis.  
4.1 The Resource Hypothesis 
The more personal resources a person has, the more inclined that person would be to choose the bold prospect. 
Rationale: People with more reserve resources such as money, relevant skills, or self-confidence are better equipped to 
meet the challenge presented by the bold prospect; they are more likely to be able to contain and live with the kinds of 
dissonance anticipated in case they lose their bold gamble. 
4.2 Testing the Resource Hypothesis 
Two of the external (background) variables in the questionnaire could be interpreted as related to personal resources and 
may serve as indicators of that trait. Hence, they were hypothesized to be associated with the inclination to choose the 
bold prospect in the simple binary choice problems presented. These variables are: 
1. Gender, where male participants are assumed to have somewhat greater access to personal resources (e.g., financial 
skills). 
That men are more inclined take risks in financial matters than women, is well documented (e.g., Powell & Ansic, 1997; 
Charnessa & Gneezy, 2012; Barber & Odean, 2001). The reasons behind such findings are often traced to social or 
psychological factors (social status, self-confidence). Here we propose to attribute this difference in risk attitude to 
men's enhanced familiarity and skills in financial matters, which conceptually fall under the general umbrella of 
enhanced resources. 
2. Personal Earnings, where those with greater earning power are assumed to have more personal resources than others.  
People with greater earning power feel they can recover more easily from the dissonances expected following an 
unsuccessful gamble, than those with smaller earning power. 
For the present purpose, the variable chosen for assessing individual's earning power was student's own earnings (not 
their family incomes, which could be used as another, distinct indicator). The tacit assumption was that the actual 
experience of personally earning money suggests some financial skill (considered here as a kind of resource) that would 
be reflected in respondents' attitudes and gambling behavior, as hypothesized. Hence, participants were asked what their 
hourly pay was in their recent job, if any. Nearly eighty percent (78.57%) of the responded with a figure higher than 0. 
To test the Resource Hypothesis, we first defined a gain bold player as one whose number of bold choices from 
amongst the 22 gains problems exceeds the average number (6.94) of bold choices in the sample. Similarly, we define a 
loss bold player as one whose number of bold choices from amongst the 22 loss problems exceeds the average number 
(11.79) of bold choices in the sample. Then the proportions of gain bold players and of loss bold players were computed 
for each subgroup— for males and females; and for "rich" and "poor" (defined according to whether the pay per hour 
exceeded the median or not). The results are shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Proportions (%) of Gains-Bold-Players and of Loss-Bold-Players 
(i) by gender; (ii) by Earnings 
(i) Gender 
 
Male Female Difference Significance 
Gains 65.5 49.3 16.2 0.07 
Losses 60.0 62.0 -2.0 n.s. 
 
(ii) Earnings 
 
Rich Poor Difference Significance 
Gains 65.1 47.6 17.5 0.05 
Losses 60.3 61.9 -1.6 n.s. 
 
Table 3 supports the Resource Hypothesis only for gain problems. Men more than women, and separately, the "rich" 
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more than the "poor", were inclined to face the challenge posed by the bold prospects of gain problems. However, no 
significant differences were found by gender or by earnings with respect to loss-problems. This interesting result, at 
variance with our hypothesis, calls attention to the essential asymmetry between losses and gains. We shall comment on 
this asymmetry below, in Subsection 5.7 of the discussion. 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Cutting the Umbilical Cord 
It is only natural that in the search for descriptive theories of choice under risk, prescriptive EUT has been adopted the 
as a point of departure: EUT is based on the plausible axioms of rational choice and on the compelling von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem. But, in the face of systematic violations of EUT observed in human behavior, 
descriptive theories, including the psychological-process theories, refined and improved EUT with important insights 
from psychology. The Challenge Theory of decision under risk proposed in this article aims to complete this trend by 
asserting that the psychological approach to decision under risk can stand on its own, without the historic normative 
economic platform.  
As a psychological theory, Challenge Theory seeks to trace the mental processes that take place in decision making and 
specifically with reference the possible shift from a default choice to the alternative. This is in contrast with the 
economic approach which assumes that people evaluate and compare available prospects as separate, distinct entities. In 
this sense, CT is a processual rather than a static theory. Moreover, rather than identify the one, universally best decision, 
CT takes account of individual differences in preferring the bold prospect (as defined here) and enables relaing such 
preferences to other individual characteristics. 
CT presented in this study points to a research approach that aims to predict risk behavior and tests this approach in the 
case of simple binary decision problems. The viability of the proposed approach must be evaluated by suitable 
experimental replications and by studying the values of the optimizing parameters in diverse populations and 
experimental circumstances. 
5.2 The Psychological Model 
CT considers decision-makers' anticipated feelings towards the possible outcome of the prospect not chosen. However, 
CT does not incorporate these feelings (of regret or rejoicing) into the prospects offered to obtain a value for each 
prospect. Rather, having specified the default prospect preferred by the "automatic mind" (System 1 Processing), it 
assesses the difficulty, or the challenge experienced by the decision maker in abandoning this initial preference in favor 
of an alternative, the bold prospect. The decision maker's task amounts then to deciding whether to meet this challenge 
level. The decision itself is personal and is determined by personality characteristics and circumstances to be explored. 
Challenge Theory posits that the decision process in binary risk problems involves comparing the two outcomes, x0, and 
x1, and proceeds to represent this comparison in the form of a ratio between the monotonically transformed outcomes. 
This ratio constitutes one factor in the CI equation. It is plotted in Figure 3 as a function of its argument-pair (x0, x1). CT 
decision process also involves comparing the two probabilities, p0 and p1, associated with the outcomes. The result of 
this comparison, in the form of the difference between the monotonically transformed probabilities, constitutes the 
second factor in the CI equation. This difference is plotted in Figure 4 as a function of its argument-pair (p0, p1). Thus, 
CT decision process contrasts with that implied by most theories where options (x0, p0) and (x1, p1) are first evaluated 
separately to obtain a total worth for each, and then the two options are compared, typically by computing the difference 
between their total worth or an increasing function of that difference (e.g., Erev et al., 2010).  
5.3 Effects: Certainty, Reflection, Low Probabilities and Loss Aversion in CT Perspective 
It is of interest to examine the manifestations in CT of effects proposed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) to account for 
observed choice behavior. Such an examination can cast light and enhance understanding of the paradigmatic shift 
embodied in CT. Table 4 illustrates effects that are apparent in binary non-mixed gambles. 
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Table 4. Illustration of Effects and their Manifestation in Terms of CI 
 
Effect 
 
Problem 
D=Default 
B=Bold option 
% Bold 
 
CI*100 
 
1. Certainty/Allais Paradox 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 
following Allais, 1953. 
D: 3000, 1 
B: 4000, .80 
32% 6.64 
D': 3000, .25 
B': 4000, .20 
57% 2.80 
2. Reflection 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 
D: 3000, 1 
B: 4000, .80 
32% 6.64 
D': -4000, .80 
B': -3000, 1 
40%* 3.08 
3. Overweighting low 
probabilities 
D: 3000, .02 
B: 6000, .01
**
 
65% 1.57 
4. Loss Aversion 
 
See Table 5 and discussion below 
* Recall that in loss problems, the often-labelled "safer" option (i.e., the option of higher probability of a smaller loss; 
here, (-3000, 1)) is defined in CT as the bold option and the 'risky' option is defined in CT as the default option.  
** In Kahneman & Tversky (1979) the problem was: (3000, .002; 6000, .001).  
 
The certainty effect is illustrated by the first problem of Table 4, row 1, (3000,.8; 3000,1). Respondents' preferences in 
this problem are affected by the relatively high CI (CI*100=6.64) which according to CT central hypothesis entails a 
relatively low proportion of bold choices (32% in the present study; 20% in Kahneman & Tversky, (1979)). The two 
choice-problems in row 1 illustrate a two-outcome simplified version of Allais paradox (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
where the probabilities in the first problem were multiplied by 0.25 to obtain those of the second problem. The 
seemingly inconsistent high preference rates for the less certain option (B') in the second problem in row 1, (3000, .25; 
4000, 20), is explained by CT simply: Because of the smaller difference between the two probabilities (0.25-0.20=0.05), 
CI is much lower here (CI*100=2.80) than in the first problem (6.64), prompting the gambler to go for the bold option. 
The reflection effect is expressed in CT simply as adherence (by the majority) to the respective default option: (3000, 1) 
in gains and to (-4000, .80) in losses. See problems in Table 4 row 2, where a minority (40%) chose bold (in Kahneman 
& Tversky (1979) the corresponding figure was18%). While in Prospect Theory the reflection effect is regarded as a 
curious reversal -- a surprising switch from risk aversion to risk seeking (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 p. 268); In CT the 
reflection effect is built-in into the conceptual basis of the theory.  
The effect of overweighting low probabilities is illustrated in the problem in Table 4 row 3. In CT terms this 
overweighting is a consequence of the very small difference (0.01) between the probabilities which results in low CI 
(CI*100=1.57), i.e., strong inclination to shift from the default to the bold option, (6000, 0.01). An essentially different 
effect, also considered by Kahneman & Tversky (1979, p.281) as an instance of overweighting low probabilities, occurs 
in the problem (5, 1; 5000, 0.001), where only one probability is low and 72% were found to prefer the bold option 
(5000, 0.001). Kahneman & Tversky's explanation involves the shapes of the value and weighting functions. But CT 
explains the observed preference differently, namely, by the very small ratio of x0^a0/x1^a1 resulting in an extremely low 
CI. These arguments hold equally for the corresponding loss problems (Problems 8' and 14' in Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). 
The predominance of loss-avoidance over gain-seeking (a phenomenon known as loss aversion) is manifested by CT in 
the difference between CI+, the CI of a given gain problem, and CI-, the CI of its symmetrical (mirror-image) loss 
problem7. Table 5 presents this difference (CI+ - CI-)*100 for the five symmetrical gain/loss problem-pairs in our study. 
See last column in Table 5. The essential thing to notice about these differences is their sign: they are all positive, i.e., 
CI+ > CI-. According to CT this means that people are more likely to switch from the default option to the bold option in 
                                                        
7
 I.e., the loss problem created from the given gain problem by switching the outcome signs from positive to negative. 
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losses than in gains; hence, more likely to avoid the greater loss than to opt for the greater gain of a similar size. The 
magnitudes of the recorded differences (CI+-CI-) may well reflect the extent of loss aversion in each case, suggesting 
that loss aversion depends on the probabilities as well as on the outcomes.  
It is noteworthy that the four effects discussed above are explained in CT by the single parameter CI, not by reference to 
the shapes of value functions or weighting functions, whose stability is not assumed by CT. 
Table 5. CT Representation of Loss Aversion 
CI in a Gain Problem is Greater than in the Symmetrical Loss Problem 
 
Illustration No. 
Problem-Pair 
D=Default 
B=Bold option 
% Bold (This Study) 
CI*100 
 
∆CI*100 
(CI+-CI-) *100 
1 
D: 3000, 1 
B: 4000, .80 
32% 6.64 
3.36 
D': -4000, .80 
B': -3000, 1 
40% 3.08 
2 
D: 3000, .25 
B: 4000, .20 
57% 2.80 
1.47 
D': -4000, .20 
B': -3000, 25 
68% 1.33 
3 
D: 3000, .90 
B: 6000, .45 
9% 7.61 
4.59 
D': -6000, .45 
B': -3000, 90 
36% 3.01 
4 
D: 240, 1 
B: 1000, .25 
23% 6.59 
3.84 
D': -1000, .25 
B': -240, 1 
38% 2.74 
5 
D: 3000, .02 
B: 6000, .01 
65% 1.57 
0.41 
D': -6000, .01 
B': -3000, .02 
55% 1.15 
 
Finally, it is interesting to comment on how CT conceptual framework can take account of dominated prospects directly 
and simply: If xi>xj>0 and pi>pj the analytic mind (System 2 processing) reinforces and readily confirms the automatic 
mind initial evaluation based on the p's. No prior editing phase (suggested in Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) is required; 
the entire decision process is naturally captured by the psychological model. 
5.4 The Impact of Outcomes and Probabilities on Decisions: CT vs. EUT-Based Theories 
EUT-based descriptive theories use value and weighting functions to transform outcomes and probabilities. The 
transformed quantities (often interpreted as subjective outcomes and subjective probabilities, respectively) serve to 
compute the total worth of each prospect for explaining empirically observed preferences. In CT, an outcome, x0 or x1, 
is not conceived as impacting on the decision by itself, but rather as acting within the pair (x0, x1), where the outcomes 
are transformed and combined to form the ratio, 𝑥𝑎0/𝑥𝑎1 , constituting the first factor in the CI equation. Hence, it is 
the impact of this pair on decision (in effect, on the value of the challenge index, CI) that is of interest. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3. Similarly, the transformed probabilities are combined to form the difference, 𝑤0(𝑝0) − 𝑤1 (𝑝1 ),  
constituting the second factor in the CI equation illustrated in Figure 4.  
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Figure 3. The First Factor, x0^a0 / x1^a1, of CI as a Function of the Two Outcomes: Illustration with a0=1.19, a1=1.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The Second Factor, w(p0)-w(p1), of CI as a Function of the Two Probabilities, where (𝑝) =
𝛿𝑝𝛾
𝛿𝑝𝛾+ (1−𝑝)𝛾
 . 
Illustration with γ=0.73; δ=2.62 
Observed decisions are now explained by the single quantity CI, not by shapes of value functions or weighting 
functions, as such. And since each of the outcomes offered is not considered separately (but only in conjunction with the 
other outcome in the pair), the transformed outcome need not be interpreted as representing a subjective value of that 
outcome. 
Yet, it is of interest to note the magnitudes of the extracted parameters, a0, a1, γ, and δ, which jointly optimize predictions, 
and compare them with those that may be obtained in future studies. Do they vary with the type of population? Do they 
vary with the magnitudes of the amounts or the probabilities? Or with the spacings between the amounts or the 
probabilities? And, ultimately, how good are the resultant predictions in cross-validation exercises? 
5.5 How Many Free Parameters? 
As noted above (Section 3.1), this paper details results obtained for the choice of four free parameters. This choice was 
made after comparing results obtained as the number of parameters increases from 3 to 4 and from 4 to 6. We found that 
while in gains the improvements in r were small (from -.9145 to -.9174 to -.9276); in the case of losses a larger 
improvement (from -.9098 to -.9314) was recorded when the number of parameters increased from 3 to 4. (But in the 
6-parameter model improvement was small again, with r= -.9376.) Hence for losses we opted for the 4-parameter model 
and for reasons of symmetry adopted the same number of parameters for gains. However, our evidence for the optimal 
number of free parameters is not conclusive and the simpler model of three parameters, a, γ, δ (i.e. a0=a1), for gains and 
three, a', γ', δ', (i.e. a'0=a'1), for losses which yielded here a good fit with the data (r=-.9145 for gains and r=-.9098 for 
losses), should be re-examined in future studies. At this point it is worth noting that the technical simplicity of the 
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3-parameter model in each case (gains and losses) is accompanied by an appealing substantive-interpretative advantage: 
With the outcomes raised to the same power, the ratio x0/x1 becomes a basic, psychologically meaningful quantity. 
In conclusion of this subsection, we note that alternative functional forms have not been systematically tested in this 
study. The power functional form adopted here for transforming the outcomes has been justified and employed by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and by others (e.g. Harrison et al., 2009). As for the functional form for transforming 
probabilities, we did consider the one-parameter functional form 𝑤(𝑝) =
𝑝𝛾
(𝑝𝛾+ (1−𝑝)𝛾)1/𝛾
 employed by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) but found it to produce much poorer results in this study (r=-0.71 for gains and -0.60 for losses) than 
the function employed here. For comparison, when no parameters at all were used, (i.e., if 𝐶𝐼 =
|𝑥0|
|𝑥1|
(𝑝0 − 𝑝1 ) The 
results were about the same for gains (r=-0.69) but lower for losses (r=-0.47). 
5.6 The Role of Extant Wealth: Three Views 
What is the role of a person's existing wealth in preferring one prospect over another when facing a decision problem? 
In EUT the objects of choice are probability distributions over total wealth. Hence, the expected consequences of the 
decision (gains or losses) are each combined with extant wealth to assess the value to the decision maker of the resultant 
total wealth. Prospect Theory, based on people's observed behavior, finds that existing wealth usually marks a reference 
point relative to which, gains and losses are defined and assessed by the decision maker. But PT assigns no essential 
role to existing wealth in decision making itself and reveals that "The carriers of values are gains and losses, not final 
assets" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, p. 299). Challenge Theory, in its reconstruction of the decision process, 
essentially accepts this view. However, by foregoing the need to determine a normative choice and allowing instead 
individual differences, CT opens the door for investigating associations between risk behavior and other individual 
characteristics, such as wealth, as was demonstrated above in Section 4, thereby assigning a role to extant wealth. 
Moreover, CT allows for associating risk behavior with flexible interpretations of wealth such as those that include 
present or future earning power, confidence in future life-prospects and other manifestations of individual resources. 
5.7 The Gain-Loss Asymmetry 
Arithmetically, positive and negative numbers are symmetrical about the 0 point. Psychologically, the prospect of 
obtaining a positive amount is interpreted and processed by the mind differently from incurring a negative amount, i.e., 
a loss. This psychological asymmetry is manifested for example by the phenomenon labeled "loss aversion" by Tversky 
& Kahneman (1992). The reasons for this asymmetry could be as follows.  
To conceive the loss of an amount of money, one must first picture that amount thereby endowing it with a sort of 
mental existence. Then one must perform the opposite mental operation of annulment to conceive the absence of that 
amount8. This operation which involves an extra mental burden in conceiving a loss—compared with that of conceiving 
a gain -- may account for asymmetries between gains and losses in choice behavior. For the extra cognitive complexity 
of conceiving a loss (a difficulty that may be coded by the automatic processing system as an added risk) inclines the 
decision maker towards the less risky option. This is a psychological-processual explanation, referring to the mental 
processing of input information.  
But there is deeper, more substantive asymmetry between gains and losses. A gain is perceived by the living organism 
as an incidental favorable event, one whose recurrence is likely to be advantageous. A loss, on the other hand, is 
interpreted by the organism as a potential threat to its very structure; since its recurrence can destroy the organism as a 
living system.9  
Challenge Theory exhibits both, similarities and differences, between gains and losses. A basic formal similarity is 
embodied in Eq. (3), a single formula that assesses the challenge-level for both gains and losses. This is noteworthy 
because our reconstruction of the cognitive decision process involving gains and that involving losses, were conducted 
separately and independently. 
An interesting difference between gain and loss problems appears in our investigation of the association between bold 
choice behavior and personal resources: Thus, while as hypothesized, people who earn more are more likely to prefer 
                                                        
8 Cf. Ironic Process Theory; e.g., "Don’t think of a white bear". 
9 Excessive gains can also be detrimental to a system, constituting a potential threat to its structural stability (Shye, 
1989; 2014). However, usually they are not perceived as a threat because of a tacit assumption that resources are 
generally limited, rendering the occurrence of harmful gains unlikely.  
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the bold prospect in gain problems, no such association was found in the case of loss problems (Table 3). It seems that 
when losses are in sight the poor are just as likely to prefer the bold prospect as the rich precisely because (pursuing 
System 2 processing) that prospect sets a limit on the amount of possible loss, protecting them from excessive loss, to 
which they are more vulnerable. 
Finally, the present findings exhibit similarity in the order-of-magnitude of the four key parameters, a0, a1, γ, δ, inferred 
for gain problems and inferred for loss problems. The differences originate in the psychological difference between 
gains and losses and, as argued above, represent the predominance of loss-avoidance over gain-seeking behavior, 
known as loss aversion.  
6. Conclusion 
Challenge Theory tackles the question of explaining choice under risk from a psychological perspective rather than an 
economic one. Forgoing the relics of EUT, such as the rationality axioms, the notions of expected value, risk-seeking or 
risk-aversion and the concern with identifying the one most preferred choice, Challenge Theory suggests a new 
paradigm and proposes a simple formula, based on a reconstruction of mental decision processes, for describing the 
relative frequency of people who prefer one prospect over another in a class of simple binary choice problems. The 
possibility that opens up for associating individual choice behavior with other personality traits carries with it the 
promise of enriching the study of behavior under risk, with possible relevance to domains of application. 
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Appendix: Two-Fold Cross Validation 
1. Procedure 
The sample of 126 respondents was randomly divided into two subsamples, A and B. The following cross-validation 
procedure was carried out separately for gain-problems and for loss problems. Each subsample in its turn served as a 
Training Subsample on which the optimization procedure was performed, resulting in  
(i) the optimized r(CI, Pb), the correlation between Challenge Index and the proportion choosing the bold prospect; and 
in  
(ii) four optimizing value-function and weighting-function parameters.  
Then, these four parameters were employed to compute r(CI, Pb) in the alternative subsample, Testing-Subsample. 
2. Results 
Results of this cross-validation exercise are satisfactory both in the case of gains and in the case of losses: r(CI, Pb) 
remain very high in all testing-subsamples. The correlations obtained in the testing subsamples are as high as in the 
training subsample in the case of gains, and almost as high in the case of losses. 
 
Table 6. Results of Two-Fold Cross Validation 
In this table, the row "A => B" indicates results of the cross validation procedure where 
A is the training subsample and B is the testing subsample. In "B => A" subsample roles are reversed. 
 
Training- 
Subsample 
Correlation 
Value Function 
Parameters Exponents 
Weighting Function 
Parameters 
Curvature  Elevation 
Testing- 
Subsample 
 Correlation 
 
r a0 a1 γ δ r 
GAINS 
      
       A => B -0.9 1.18 1.15 0.7 2.41 -0.9 
       B => A -0.92 1.27 1.23 0.77 2.84 -0.92 
       Average -0.91 1.225 1.19 0.735 2.625 -0.91 
       LOSSES 
      
       A => B -0.89 1.74 1.48 0.65 2.72 -0.88 
       B => A -0.91 1.39 1.33 0.67 3.66 -0.89 
       Average -0.9 1.565 1.405 0.66 3.19 -0.885 
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